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Abstract 
Subsea blowout preventer (BOP) is a safety-related instrumented system that is used in 
underwater oil drilling to prevent the well to blowut. As oil and gas exploration moves into 
deeper waters and harsher environments, the setbacks related to reliable functioning of the BOP 
system and its subsystems remain a major concern for researchers and practitioners. This study 
aims to systematically review the current state-of-the-art and present a detailed description about 
some of the recently developed methodologies for through-life management of the BOP system. 
Challenges associated with the system design, reliability analysis, testing, deployment as well as 
operability and maintainability are explored, and then the areas requiring further research and 
development will be identified. A total of 82 documents published since 1980’s are critically 
reviewed and classified according to two proposed frameworks. The first framework categorises 
the literature based on the depth of water in which the BOP systems operate, with a sub-
categorization based on the Macondo disaster. The second framework categorises the literature 
based on the techniques applied for the reliability analysis of BOP systems, including Failure 
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Reliability Block Diagram 
(RBD), Petri Net (PN), Markov modelling, Bayesian Network (BN), Monte Carlo Simulation 
(MCS), etc. Our review analysis reveals that the reliability analysis and testing of BOP has 
received the most attention in the literature, whereas the design, deployment, and operation and 
maintenance (O&M) of BOPs received the least. 
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In the process of drilling a well for oil and gas, the wellbore is usually lined with a casing 
through which a drill string runs. The annular (ring-shaped) region between the casing and the 
drill stem is filled with drilling mud which provides hydrostatic pressure to restrict formation 
fluids (oil/gas) from coming up the wellbore. When a drill bit punctures a hydrocarbon reservoir, 
underground pressure forces formation fluids into the wellbore. Throughout the drilling process, 
these fluids try to force their way through the annulus. Primary well control during drilling is 
achieved through a counterbalance of reservoir pressu  by hydrostatic mud pressure. The 
appropriate safety margin is achieved by varying the fluid density. When this pressure is lost 
during a kick, the Blowout Preventer (BOP) is employed as an alternative.  
As a large specialized, mechanical array of valves, as embled to seal wells against kicks or 
blowouts during drilling or work-over operations, a typical BOP consists of Lower Marine Riser 
Package (LMRP) and a combination of several types of preventers, differing in number and 
capacity principally for operational reasons. Figure 1 shows the conventional and modern BOP 
systems with their main components including: connectors (wellhead and LMRP), BOP control 
system, flex joint, annular preventer (upper and lower), ram preventers, choke and kill system. 
** Figure 1 ** 
Figure 1. (a) A conventional BOP and (b) a modern BOP. 
Based on operators’ choice, BOP subsystems may differ in number, size and capacity, 
particularly so as exploration in deeper water is seemingly the most prospective way forward [1]. 
Aside the failsafe function of monitoring and mainting well integrity, BOP system’s primary 
functions are: (i) to confine or seal off well fluids in the well bore; (ii) to provide means of 
adding or withdrawing controlled volumes of fluid to and from the well bore; and (iii) to shut or 
‘kill’ the well and seal the wellhead. 
The annular or ram preventers with their associated components seal and/or shear the 
wellbore and its contents through hydraulic power stored and launched from accumulators. 
Hence, importance of the seals cannot be overemphasised. Connectors link the entire assembly to 
the wellhead and to the riser which is directly hooked to the drilling platform, whereas the choke 
and kill system are laden with valves, lines and hoses in order to safely transfer fluids to and 
from the system. A pilot control system consisting of modular pods is also embedded within the 
LMRP for essential control functions. 
The BOP has maintained the all-important function of a drilling safety barrier since its 
discovery in the early 1900s. Due to its robust nature and complex assembly, little modification 
has been made since its entry into the oil and gas market and its acceptance as last line of defense 
for any drilling or workover operation. However, as oil and gas exploration moves into deeper 
waters and harsher environments, the setbacks related to reliable functioning of the BOP system 
and its subsystems remain a major concern for research rs, operators and other stakeholders in 
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the industry. The BOP system failures usually result in injury/loss of life, economic losses, 
environmental damage and possible damage to oil reservoir [2, 3]. According to [4], 65% of 
blowouts occur through the BOP, either through the drill string or the annulus. An efficient way 
to avoid blowouts is to improve design, reliability, esting and certification, and operation and 
maintenance (O&M) of BOP systems. 
This study aims to systematically review the current state-of-the-art and present a detailed 
description about some of the recently developed methodologies for through-life management of 
the BOP system. The challenges associated with the BOP system design, reliability analysis, 
testing, deployment, as well as its operability andmaintainability in the oil and gas industry are 
identified, analyzed and discussed. For this purpose, a total of eighty-two (82) documents 
published since 1980’s are critically reviewed and classified according to two proposed 
frameworks. The first framework categorises the litra ure based on the depth of water in which 
the BOP systems operate, with a sub-categorization based on the Macondo disaster. The second 
framework categorises the literature based on the techniques applied for the reliability analysis of 
BOP systems, including Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), 
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD), Petri Net (PN), Markov modelling, Bayesian Network (BN), 
Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS), etc. The areas requiring further research and development will 
also be identified and discussed.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief description of the reviewed literature 
on the challenges associated with safe and reliable operation of BOPs is given in Section 2. The 
reliability analysis techniques applied for the reliability analysis of BOPs are presented in 
Section 3. Section 4 contains the analysis and discussions of the findings, and Section 5 
concludes the study and provides future research diections 
2. The reviewed literature 
This section attempts to review systematically the papers published about the challenges 
associated with safe and reliable operation of subsea BOPs. The review focuses on identifying 
drawbacks and areas of amelioration with regards to system safety and reliability as well as the 
techniques applied to analyze and improve the device maintainability. This implies that 
documents relating to other aspects such as overall functioning, historical development, general 
design, etc. are not inclusive. All relevant sources of literature were identified through keyword 
searching of databases. These sources included journal articles, conference proceedings, 
technical reports and governmental documents published ince 1980’s. Publications in languages 
other than English and text books and dissertations were excluded from the review. 
Due to the varied nature and extensive scope of documentation, we propose two frameworks 
to classify the reviewed sources. The first framework is based on safety and reliability challenges 
identified in shallow water (<500), deep water (>500), or general related issues. The second 
framework categorises the literature based on the techniques applied for the reliability analysis of 
BOP systems. The classification based on water depth indicates that the research methods and 
findings in the document are specifically within the said boundaries. The classification ‘general’ 
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will indicate any other research with no such specific boundaries but related and within the scope 
of analysis. Within each category, sub-divisions are identified relating literature prior to or after 
the Macondo disaster in the Gulf of Mexico (GoM). Investigations and research into this event 
has sparked a rapid evolution in safety, risk and reliability awareness of BOPs and the oil and gas 
industry in general.  
2.1 Deep and shallow waters 
Despite the outlined importance of the BOP, technological advancement in the petroleum 
industry in general has actually been a forced issue, mainly in response to business needs [5]. 
Drilling success rates in conventional deep water (>500m) seemed to have peaked recently [6] 
and advances in ultra-deep (UD) zones (>1500m) are inc asingly economically feasible. Worth 
noting is the fact that approximately 58 billion barrel of oil equivalent (BBOE) have been 
discovered in deep waters, with more than half the amount found after 1995 [5]. Drilling and 
exploration have taken a massive leap into deep and UD waters. This affects general operation 
and handling of BOPs as manufacturers now face the inherent challenge of modifying the device 
to fit new environments, without compromising reliability.  
BOPs in the 1950s were simple 11", 3000psi rated devices, working for a few days in depths 
of about 1500ft. Nowadays, newly discovered deep and UD oil fields require up to 20,000psi 
rated 18 3/4" BOPs [7], capable of lasting for the lif of the well. Size notwithstanding, 
unexplored terrain in new water depths present unique challenges and peculiar difficulties [8]. 
UD waters are characterized by high pressure, high temperature (HPHT) zones, gas pockets, and 
increasing amount of hydrogen sulphide (H2S), with associated reliability problems such as 
infant mortality, depth/pressure sensitivity, environmental corrosion/erosion, salt water ingress 
and design performance failures [9]. According to [10], problems associated with the increase in 
water depth include: weather problems, mechanical failures of subsea equipment, wellbore 
instability, formation and cementing issues and specifically, BOP challenges. Blowout control in 
these new environments has not been mastered and isoften handled reactively. These issues have 
shaped recent BOP research as greater reliability and availability are more than ever, highly 
desirable. Operators and other industry partners seek to cut down the inevitable costs associated 
with deeper water operations without compromising the reliability of the device. 
2.2 Pre and post Macondo disaster 
The Macondo disaster that left the GOM coast flooded with more than four (4) million barrels of 
oil and the loss of 11 lives [11] resulted in a re-examination of the ‘safe’ perception of the oil/gas 
industry and the one of its principal safety equipment, the BOP, in particular [12]. Investigations 
after the disaster revealed several pitfalls within the device, which could have simply been 
overlooked or minimised prior to the April 2010 event. This has since led to rapid evolution of 
both prescriptive and performance-based regulations and safety management system 
requirements governing the BOP and the industry at large. A brief summary of the BOP 




** Table 2 ** 
Table 1. Classification of BOP Challenges (deep-water related) 
** Table 2 ** 
Table 2. Classification of BOP Challenges (Shallow water related) 
** Table 3 ** 
Table 3. Classification of BOP challenges (General) 
With regard to the oil and gas industry, regulatory changes started with the dissolution of the 
Mineral Management Service (MMS) – which had been in charge of the safety and security of 
operations on the outer continental shelf (OCS) – and its replacement with the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management (BOEM) and Bureau of Safety and environment enforcement (BSEE) [86]. 
Changes were also made to the drilling safety rules, worst-case blowout response and well-
containment measures [87]. The Macondo incident also had a profound impact on theoretical 
research. In the wake of the accident, the amount of research performed focusing on the 
reliability of offshore drilling assets and more specifically, BOP reliability, increased markedly 
as the BOP increased in relative significance. Going by the sheer volume, the amount of research 
performed on BOP reliability in the ten years following the Macondo incident greatly exceeds 
the amount of research performed in the three decades prior.   
3. BOP reliability analysis techniques 
This section reviews the results of the classification framework based on the techniques adopted 
for reliability analysis of BOP systems. Only literature with subject matter relating to BOP 
reliability analysis have been included in this classification. The purpose of this framework is to 
better categorize existing research and ease further s udies in BOP reliability analysis. 
In response to recent events in the industry, a lot of attention has been shown to the 
reliability of BOP systems. However, the research on the topic is still lacking in some regard 
[70]. The reliability assessment of subsea BOP system  has come a long way since Holand and 
Rausand [33] used a combination of drilling, BOP test, well and equipment failure reports and 
applied Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) as a means of reliability assessment. Some years later, Fowler 
and Roche [42] applied FTA and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to assess the 
reliability of a subsea BOP and a hydraulic control system. Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs) 
were also used by Zou et al. [74] to model the reliability performance of subsea BOPs and then 
the results were compared against design requirements. Some advanced reliability analysis 
techniques which provide more robust solutions have also been applied in recent years, however, 
gaps still exist with regards to incorporation of maintenance strategies and dynamic operating 
condition of the BOPs.  
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The reliability analysis techniques discussed within t is review focus on the application to 
subsea BOPs and their components. The following subsections give brief summaries on each 
technique.  
3.1. Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) 
The application of FMEA as a technique to assess sytem reliability dates back for at least five 
decades and its use and effectiveness in a myriad of industries is well documented. The FMEA 
process begins with a qualitative analysis of the system in question and its functions followed by 
a quantitative analysis which explores each component, identifies their failure modes and 
determines the effects of those failure modes on the overall system. A risk priority number 
(RPN) which serves as a means to prioritise and rank the identified risks is developed. It 
considers three factors: severity of impact (S), likelihood of occurrence (O) and likelihood of 
detection (D) [88]. Though it has been criticized on multiple occasions over time on account of 
the RPN, as a reliability assessment technique, it has quite a number of advantages which help 
justify its use. The FMEA technique can be used to identify failure modes and evaluate risks 
early in the design process, it ensures that risks are comprehensively identified and categorised, 
and it helps the analyst determine the system’s functio al vulnerabilities [89]. The FMEA 
technique has been applied a number of times towards nalysis of BOP reliability in literature. 
The technique was applied in [53] towards three BOP reliability analyses performed on specific 
BOP components. Shafiee et al. [79] also discussed its application in conjunction with FTA in 
order to perform risk analysis on a subsea BOP. When a criticality is involved, the analysis is 
referred to as Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). 
3.2. Fault tree analysis (FTA) 
The fundamental theory of FTA is the conversion of a system into an organized logic structure 
(Lee et al., 1985). Over time, its definition has evolved to being a diagram which depicts the 
relationships between a possible critical event in he system and its causes [90]. In terms of 
system maintenance, FTA allows operators identify and then qualify the initiating failure causes 
that will help set the stage for developing a maintenance program fit to maintain system 
reliability at the required level [91]. There are two types of nodes which make up a fault tree, 
namely: the event nodes and gate node. Events can be either basic (meaning they cannot be 
deconstructed into smaller events) or intermediate (meaning they are represented as a 
combination of basic events and other intermediate events) [92]. The types of gates include the 
AND gate (which represents the combination of all inputs to produce the output event) and the 
OR gate (which represents the existence of the output provided at least one of the input events 
exists) [93]. Performing FTA consists of the following steps [94]: 
• System and boundary definition; 
• Fault tree construction; 
• Minimal cut set definition; 
• Qualitative analysis; 
• Quantitative analysis. 
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The FTA technique has been applied for the analysis of BOP reliability in a number of 
studies. Holand and Rausand [33] used it in conjunctio  with failure reports as a means of 
assessing the reliability of subsea BOPs. Mutlu et al. [84] performed a qualitative FTA to assess 
the reliability of a BOP control system. In another study, Zhang et al. [77] discussed its 
application in combination with fuzzy analysis theory to determine the reasons for failure of an 
annular BOP.  
 
3.3. Markov modelling (MM) 
The Markov method is a modelling technique applied to analyse the reliability of fault tolerant 
systems [95]. It depicts the system to be analysed using state circles and transition arcs which 
form a Markov transition diagram. The Markov method is known for being flexible and has been 
noted in several literature as being uniquely suitable for reliability assessment of redundant 
systems such as BOP [96]. It also is a very suitable technique to solve dynamic problems which 
conventional reliability analysis techniques such as FTA and FMEA cannot deal with. The 
Markov chain, which is a stochastic process that possesses a Markov property, is used to model 
multi-state systems as well as the transitions betwe n the states. It can be described as discrete-
time or continuous-time depending on the time variable for a particular process [90]. The 
Markov method does have its shortcomings. For instance, it can be quite tedious to determine 
transition rates due to lack of data. Also in some complex systems, it is very possible that some 
states and transitions are omitted when defining both elements [97]. In literature, Kim et al. [63] 
applied the Markov modelling to reliability analysis of subsea BOPs by considering demand rate 
for its components.  
3.4. Monte-Carlo simulation (MCS) 
Monte Carlo simulation is one of the most commonly used tools for reliability analysis of 
engineering systems. This is due to its independence from the complexities of the problem it is 
trying to solve [98]. The main drawback associated with MCS is its inaccuracy and inefficiency 
in dealing with very small failure probabilities. To overcome this shortcoming, subset simulation 
(SS) was developed. SS is a simulation tool used for handling small failure probabilities. This 
technique was developed as a result of the apparent in fficiencies associated with using direct 
MCS to compute reliability problems which contain small failure probabilities [99]. Using SS 
requires expressing the failure probability of the ev nt in question as an amalgamation of chosen 
smaller probabilities [100]. SS has been applied to different engineering systems such as 
reliability of subsea pipelines [98], dynamic stiffness of large offshore wind turbines [101], and 
so on.  
3.5. Petri Net (PN) 
The PN concept, which was developed by Dr Carl Petri as part of his PhD dissertation, is a 
reliability method applied to modelling and assessment of non-deterministic, parallel systems 
[64]. As an extremely versatile technique, it can be used to evaluate redundant systems, 
manufacturing systems, and safety-critical elements, among others [57, 102, 103]. The technique 
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can be used as a graphical tool – for aiding visual communication, and as a mathematical tool – 
for developing mathematical models which govern the behaviour of systems [104]. There are 
four main modelling elements which make up the PN. These include: places, arcs, transitions and 
tokens. Places are denoted by circles, transitions by rectangles, tokens by solid circles which are 
located inside places and arcs connect places with transitions. There are multiple variations to the 
PN technique such as the coloured petri net (CPN), the stochastic petri net (SPN) and the 
deterministic and stochastic petri net (DSPN). The SPN is very suitable for complex dynamic 
systems such as the BOP due to the fact that it explicitly introduces the time parameter [105]. In 
a recent study, Elusakin and Shafiee [106] applied th  SPN technique to analyse the reliability of 
subsea BOPs with different failure modes subject to ondition-based maintenance (CBM).  
3.6.  Bayesian Network (BN) 
According to Langseth and Portinale [107], BN is a compact representation of a multi-variate 
statistical distribution function. The BN technique has recently come into prominence as being a 
more robust and viable alternative to the conventional reliability assessment techniques such as 
FTA and FMEA [70]. This is mainly due to the fact tha  BN can perform predictive as well as 
diagnostic analyses [51]. For reliability assessment, BN models are developed by converting and 
building on the conventional reliability models. A BN model is made up of qualitative and 
quantitative sections. The qualitative section is adirected acyclic graph (DAG) containing nodes 
and arcs which denote the system variables and their dependencies respectively. The quantitative 
section highlights the connections between each node and its parents through a conditional 
probabilistic table [55]. Variations to the BN technique can be applied to evaluate system 
reliability evaluation depending on the type of system and operating circumstances. For example, 
dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs) is applied when temporal features are involved in reliability 
analysis. Object-oriented Bayesian networks (OOBNs) are appropriate for analysing the 
reliability of sizeable, complex structures. Dynamic object-oriented Bayesian networks 
(DOOBNs) are used to analyse degrading components as well as repetitive systems [108]. The 
BN technique has been applied to BOP system reliability analysis in a number of studies. 
Readers can refer to [56, 58, 67, 68, 83] for further reading.  
 
3.6. Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) 
RBD is a graphical framework in the form of block diagrams which represents how functioning 
components of a system form logical connections to complete a specific system function. It is 
suited mainly to non-repairable components and scenarios where the order in which failure occur 
is not important [90]. RBDs have three main structural configurations: series, parallel and a 
mixture of the two. A series configuration represent  all the blocks (or components) being 
required to work for the system to function. A parallel configuration represents only one 
component being required for the system to successfully function. A prime example of this is 
component redundancy. A mixture configuration is used to represent more complex models. An 
example of this being if a series system gets duplicated or made redundant. RBDs depicting 
system reliability are more often represented as a mixture of series and parallel structure 
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configurations [109]. In literature, the RBD technique has been used as part of reliability analysis 
to ascertain the impact of testing, inspection and maintenance actions on the BOP availability 
[110].  
Table 4 shows the distribution of published literatu e among the different reliability analysis 
techniques discussed. 
** Table 4 ** 
Table 4. Distribution of the literature by BOP reliability analysis techniques. 
4. Observations and findings 
4.1. Observations 
From the documents reviewed, prominent challenges associated with the BOP can be grouped 
into three principal categories: design, deployment, a d operation. Design challenges are mainly 
related to sealing, shearing, and accumulator issues; deployment challenges are associated with 
recent developments in BOP technology; and operation l challenges are related with the testing, 
inspection and maintenance, and extreme operating or environmental conditions. These three 
categories are addressed in more detail in the following sections: 
4.1.1. Design challenges 
- Sealing elements 
Due to their soft, nearly incompressible elastic properties, complex elastomeric polymers which 
are the main components of seals are used to support def rmation and compression in different 
preventer types. According to API SPEC 16A [115], these polymers must be capable of sealing 
and preventing leaks. However, leaks are common and ge erally associated with inappropriate 
elastomer selection [116, 117]. High temperature nitrile elements in packer seals have a limited 
useable temperature range [118] and are subject to extrusion and abrasion. Though largely 
elastic, they undergo stress relaxation, creep, damping and increased stiffness with frequency of 
loading, likely to worsen in unpredictable environments.  
Surrounding drilling conditions usually affect seals in two major ways: chemical 
degradation under high temperatures or stiffness/brittleness, and swelling due to fluid absorption 
after prolonged exposure. Since abrasion and extrusion cannot be totally avoided in specific parts 
like elastomeric ram packers, degradation rates are imply reduced to achieve the desired sealing 
property [40]. Material selection for specific applications, fluid compatibility and operating 
conditions on a holistic platform is necessary for inc eased reliability in deep and UD waters. 
- Shearing capabilities  
Blind and casing shear ram preventers are fitted with blades, to cut through different tubing 
types, and seal off a well. Failure to shear is not very common [10]. However, as drilling 
advances into UD waters, drill pipe properties such as material strength, toughness and ductility 
are continuously improved to reduce drill pipe failure and increase life span, which result in 
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increased shearing force requirements. Studies attribute failure-to-shear to material composition 
[119] and other increasing exogenous parameters include drilling fluid density and shut-in 
pressure. Inability to cut through drill collars, drill bits, tool joints, connectors and other drill 
pipe attachments are not uncommon. According to [120], the Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), after several months of investigation, recognized the 
importance of the BOP being ‘shear certain’, a requir ment which may well become part of 
developing industry regulations. Though current BOP designs are ambiguous, industry is 
predisposed to achieve this goal. Laser application, stronger bladders, use of explosives, greater 
hydraulic cutting pressure, are all technologies under study. New shear ram designs are already 
available in the BOP markets [121]. Some companies like Shell and BP have started the 
implementation of two blind shear rams in one stack rrangement [120] as a means to ensure 
shearing/sealing, hence improving reliability though it is a more costly option due to mobility 
and weight challenges. The manufacturing of strong yet shear-able drill collars (thinner skins and 
lead centers) is another feasible solution [3]. 
- Accumulator design and capacity 
One way to tackle the vagaries of UD environments is to modify the distance and number of 
accumulator bottles. The further accumulator bottles are located, the lower the usable fluid 
volume per accumulator bottle [23], as actuation pressure reduces with distance travelled. When 
accumulator bottles are used, communication must be established with control pods via control 
lines. Reaction time for different line diameters varies and operates by a power law relationship. 
A small diameter control line at 400 feet may react anywhere within 1 and 10 seconds in depths 
of 3000 feet [122], increasing command-to-completion time. Many techniques have been 
developed to solve this problem when the BOP is connected to the riser.  
In emergency situations, the act of shearing or dropping the drill string may become 
mandatory if rig control is lost and a functional BOP with sufficient accumulator volume should 
be able to complete this task. In deep and UD water depths, the accumulator bottles could 
become prohibitory due to increased expense and floater capability to handle such large LMRPs. 
At these depths however, charging and replenishing accumulator canisters can only be done by 
remotely operated vehicles (ROV) intervention, an area of continual questionable reliability 
[123]. As the Emergency Disconnect System (EDS), Deadman switch and blind shear rams 
depend solely on the proper functioning of hydraulics, independence from main controls in the 
event of blackouts and loss of power are vital. 
4.1.2. Deployment challenges 
Commissioning and decommissioning of BOPs are fairly simple with on-board cranes and 
hoisting systems in shallow waters. In deep-water locations, the project’s cost and schedule 
contribute immensely to overall installation activity. A winch with 20m/minute speed for 
deployment at 2500m water depth is likely to span an entire day for installation and recovery 
process [124] and even more so in adverse met-ocean conditions. All the more, recent inevitable 
redundancy and increased safety measures have creatd a weight and size footprint in subsea 
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hardware. Modern BOPs are much larger and heavier than conventional ones. They weigh about 
450 tons and have 60 feet of height [61]. Typical deep water fields also comprise of several 
blocks and reservoirs in extensive areas, making installation and maintenance costly and time-
consuming. Three factors are of primary concern with regards to subsea deployment: handling 
technology, load control and positioning, and met-ocean and weather effects. 
In recent years, the third and fourth generations of BOP systems have become popular. The 
new systems employ casing risers in place of flexib tube risers and a Subsea Isolation Device 
(SID), placed on the seabed [123]. A Subsea Deployment System (SDS) has also recently 
emerged, making use of a fully floodable solid buoyancy hull with chains attached to float 
equipment being deployed in water [125]. Though it is said to save cost and time with low risks 
for transporting heavy equipment in deep water and harsh environments, weight limitations make 
it difficult to operate beyond a limited water depth. Positioning issues such as dynamic 
responses, positioning reference issues, soil conditi s etc. are also worth considering.  
4.1.3. Operational challenges 
In spite of having high availability levels [34, 96], BOP failures are continually reported and the 
device does not seem to work properly when required [126]. In the Macondo disaster, though the 
device had been tested some days earlier and deemed fit for purpose, it failed in a similar 
sequence to most oil and gas disasters [127]. Subsea operating conditions have now gone beyond 
those specified in 30 CFR 250.517 [128], API 17N [129], API RP 53 [130] and API SPEC 16A 
[115]. Standard development and compliance activities lag behind the increasing pace of 
technology development [131]. The rewrite of API RP53 [130], which is coded as API STD 53 
[132] remains a major regulatory milestone and places additional strength to the articulated 
requirements [54]. Industry has now realised that a high level of reliability and integrity is a key 
requirement for the operation of subsea systems [133]. 
- Environmental conditions 
New operating environment remains a fundamental chal enge, flooded with high gas-oil ratios, 
HPHT regions, elevated tides and wave currents, difficult formations and even lack of 
experienced personnel [97]. Since 1992, more than 1,500 wells have been drilled in water depths 
exceeding 500m (1,500 feet) and approximately 320 wells were drilled in water depths greater 
than 1500m (5,000 feet). Safety and environmental concerns are not limited to deep water but 
stakes are relatively higher in deep waters compared to shallow waters since costs of mishap are 
proportionately higher. 
BOPs were used on conventional land mines till hydroca bon deposits were discovered on 
the ocean floors. These devices translated their safety nd control function to land rigs which 
were mounted on barges several decades ago. This became common practice for jack-up rigs as 
drilling moved to shallow waters and extended depth capabilities to about 650 feet. Then, semi-
submersible rigs and drillship evolved, moving water d pths to 1,500 feet and the BOP to the 
seabed. This move enabled the use of low pressure and less expensive risers to connect and 
transport the drill fluid back to the rig. This flexibility helped industries develop capabilities of 
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drilling rigs in locations with depth of 10,000 feet [134]. However, the initial advantage of cost 
savings has phased out over the years as greater depths have different requirements. 
- Testing, inspection and maintenance 
Minimal exogenous risk analysis is carried out during the operational life of a BOP. The 
cognizance of changing environmental conditions will certainly alter the outlook on testing, 
inspection and maintenance specified by API RP 53 [130] and BSEE 30 CFR 250.517 [128]. The 
claim that continuous usage and testing of the BOP will cause wear, therefore sometimes 
accounting for failure [34], is not uncommon and is possibly the reason for its usage only as a 
‘last’ resort during incidents. Subjecting BOPs to high pressure testing may cause wear, 
vibration, leaks and fracture which, if not properly maintained and monitored, can result in a 
disaster. However, tests are essential to ascertain proper functioning and maintenance 
procedures. Financial implications of about 5% of drilling time [17] notwithstanding, tests 
cannot be overlooked. There remains a possibility that due to above mentioned factors and other 
human limitations, test procedures are generally neglected by the drilling crew and/or regulatory 
bodies.  
Ram locks are a vital part of ram block in a BOP system and a classic example of a 
component which is not usually tested. API SPEC 16A [115] does not require testing of these 
locks when manufactured. API qualification pressure and sealing tests are carried out on new 
BOPs like other pressure containment equipment and r ted solely on bore size and design. No 
reference to external loads or water depths are provided [25]. According to these specifications, a 
good BOP test means no visible leaks. Local bearing stress and fatigue calculations are also not 
considered. Many such leaks are not detected due to high pressures employed in today’s large 
BOPs. Visual inspections are necessary to detect leaks and should be carried out by personnel 
who know where to look within the system. Progressing from a repair-on-failure philosophy, 
maintenance is an obvious tool for improving reliabi ty. Eliminating data acquisitioning 
difficulties in the oil and gas industry will make Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) more 
applicable. Maintenance logbooks may become necessary for the BOP system as well as its 
components in the oil and gas industry. The amount f time between BOP repairs may need to be 
regularly recorded. Incorrect, insufficient, inefficient and untimely maintenance may be the 
trigger to barrier failure [135].  
Though commonalities such as risk-based inspection (RBI) and robotic inspection 
technologies exist, the use of non-destructive testing (NDT) techniques will enhance the 
performance of BOPs in deeper waters [9, 136]. Techniques such as vibration analysis, infrared 
thermography, acoustic emission and ultrasound analysis can be adapted for BOP inspection 
[137]. Though vibrational analysis is costly and invasive, infrared thermography, acoustic 
emissions and ultrasound analysis are non-intrusive and can provide data on a more real-time 
basis. However, the infrared and acoustic based techniques are more susceptible to error and the 
ultrasound analysis requires more thorough understanding. These techniques, among others 
already play a role in the maintenance of offshore drilling assets and are poised to be applied to 
subsea BOP maintenance in the future [85]. 
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In order to test basic functionality of the BOP contr l system, its software is subjected to 
extensive regression testing which leads to unwanted errors. To overcome this, the hardware-in-
the-loop (HIL) testing methodology, which is a staple in the aerospace industry can be applied 
[138]. HIL testing involves the integration of actual working equipment into a simulated 
environment and this can be used to test the BOP control system software without adding 
unnecessary new functions or modifications [139].   
- Reliability 
With reliability being a foundational attribute for the safe operation of BOPs, ensuring and 
maintaining high system reliability constitutes a fundamental challenge. Reliability analysis is 
therefore performed to address the protective barriers of the BOP components. The BOP, being a 
modern drilling system, is mainly constituted of hardware, software, human and organisational 
elements. The combination of these factors coupled with the focus on failures relating to 
hardware and software raises the relative significance of errors which occur in human and 
organisational elements. In addition, complex operation l tasks such as maintenance must not 
just be performed for its own sake, but to ensure consistency between BOP reliability 
characteristics and production as well as regulatory directives [140].   
4.2. Review findings 
Critical analysis of the literature reveals the current state-of-the-art in subsea BOP operational 
safety, any progress achieved, and exposes areas requiring further regulatory, design and 
research ameliorations. More so, it is clear that tere has been increasing attention, particularly 
after 2010, on the safety of subsea BOPs, emphasising the wake-up call by the Macondo disaster.  
Pre-Macondo concerns related to the BOP are limited to overall reliability. External leakage, 
failure to seal, and lower reliability of surface preventers [40] account for approximately 53% of 
the reviewed documents. Post-Macondo however has witnessed a slight shift in focus. The years 
following the disaster has witnessed major regulatory changes, several joint industry projects and 
even a complete re-write of the API RP 53 [130], now API STD 53 [132]. Researchers have 
intensified concerns with regards to real-time monitoring [141, 142], risk monitoring [143] and 
modelling [114].  
Continual refining of design elements such as shearing blades and sealing elements are 
paramount in UD drilling. Active component redundancy and even entire system replacement 
spares are gaining increasing interest in the industry. The hydraulic control system, ram 
preventers, and hydraulic connectors fail more frequently and require unabated design 
amelioration as understanding of the new oceanographic conditions is gained.  More so, aspects 
discussed herein are largely analogous and intermitt ntly affect each other. Design improvements 
such as active redundancy may create a weight/size footprint, which in turn affects deployment. 
This implies BOP challenges, though diverse and far reaching, should be treated in a 
consolidated fashion. 
About twenty-five percent of the reviewed literature focused on deep-water related issues, 
whilst little attention has been paid to shallow water issues specifically post-Macondo. It is 
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however important to note that the documents classified as ‘general’ specific reference were not 
made to either deep or shallow water but they may still be applicable in either case. Several 
factors may be responsible for this but principally, b  2010, focus had greatly shifted to deep and 
UD waters. Aside individual research, significant efforts were made by bodies such as the 
Foundation for Scientific and Industrial Research at the Norwegian Institute of Technology 
(SINTEF) (https://www.sintef.no/en/), the U.S. Mineral Management Services (MMS) which is 
now Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) (https://www.boem.gov/) and Bureau of 
Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) (https://www.bsee.gov/). 
Other findings in terms of failure prone subsystems, common-cause failure and component 
redundancy and conventional and advanced reliability analysis techniques for subsea BOP 
systems are also discussed in followings. 
- Failure prone subsystems 
Studies reveal that some BOP subsystems fail more frequently and impair the overall reliability 
of the device. According to Holand [34], a study of 18¾ inch, 10000–15000psi rated subsea 
BOPs between the years 1978 and 1989 revealed that annular preventers, choke/kill lines and the 
hydraulic control system contributed approximately 79% of rig downtime. Choke/kill lines and 
the hydraulic control system experienced majority of failures within the study period. Other 
contemporary studies [62, 110] employing the Offshore and Onshore Reliability Data (OREDA) 
(https://www.oreda.com/) as data source agree in may ways with the latter. Slight variations are 
presented again by Holand [44], where deep-water wells (>1312ft) in the Gulf of Mexico were 
studied and main data sources included daily drilling and BOP test reports. Ram preventers seem 
to fail on a similar scale to control systems and choke/kill valves. Cai et al. [96] validated these 
results, proving that ram preventers, annular preventers, LMRP connector and wellhead 
connectors were the main components responsible for stack failure whilst the upper annular 
preventer, control pods and LMRP connector require greater maintenance effort. Pareto analysis 
of the results showed the subsystems that require urg nt design improvement. Over time, 
research and innovation programs have employed system and component redundancy to improve 
BOP reliability. Control pods, annular preventers, ram preventers, control stations and several 
valves are all redundantly configured for this purpose [64]. 
- Common-cause failure and component redundancy 
Common-cause failures have proven over time to have a dominant impact on accidents [51]. 
Redundancy in BOPs was an issue in the past when unique valves and other controls operated 
major mechanisms within the system. To enhance the reliability characteristics of a coherent 
system, redundant components may be provided, using active redundancy for component 
redundancy or system redundancy. Nowadays, rigs equipped with spare BOPs are common [94]. 
Industry introduced backups into the BOP system but over the years, due to weight, space and 
other considerations, modern systems, especially control systems incorporate less redundancy. 
Generally, the control stations, control pods, annular preventers and ram preventers are 
redundantly configured. However, the entire system can be considered as a series system, since 
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the failure of any major component category results in the failure of the entire system. A single 
failure in the hydraulics may cause total loss of control and such problems have been observed in 
the past [144]. Common cause failures of various exi ting redundant devices in the control 
system of the subsea BOP are known to reduce the reliability greatly [51]. Attempts to activate 
the Deepwater Horizon shear ram as well as the EDS failed as a result of the failure of other 
systems, resulting in a complete failure of the BOP. 
- Conventional and advanced reliability analysis 
Conventional reliability assessment methods have their own drawbacks. According to Bai and 
Bai [145], complex systems are difficult to model using the RBD technique and computing the 
system’s reliability numerically can be a time-consuming task. Both the FTA and FMEA 
techniques only work well for non-repairable systems and do not possess a time element, a 
characteristic which is extremely important when analysing subsea systems such as the BOP. In 
addition, the FMEA cannot differentiate a situation of common-cause failures or severe failures 
caused by compound failures and the FTA technique its lf is not suitable for analysis of 
sequential events [64]. Advanced reliability techniques such as Petri Net (PN), Markov Method, 
Bayesian Network (BN), Monte-Carlo Simulation (MCS) and their different variations have been 
developed and applied to assess the reliability of subsea BOPs. These advanced techniques help 
overcome some of the drawbacks of the conventional reliability assessment techniques [146]. 
The BN technique for example has come into prominence recently as being a more robust and 
viable alternative to the conventional reliability assessment techniques [70]. The Markov Method 
technique as well as the semi-Markov method are regularly used to evaluate complex systems 
such as the subsea BOP due to their flexibility in representing the dynamic behaviour of the 
system [94]. The PN technique is a numerical and graphical tool used to model asynchronous, 
simultaneous, distributed and parallel systems [103]. One of its variations, Stochastic Petri Net 
(SPN) is very suitable for complex dynamic systems because it explicitly introduces a time 
parameter [55]. 
5. Conclusions and further works 
Despite the economic challenges in the current oil and gas market, the prospects of this resource 
remaining the world’s main energy supplier are huge. Economically viable fields are still being 
discovered in waters of greater depths and unexplored terrain. This, however, raises questions 
regarding reliability, particularly that of the all-important drilling safety device, the blowout 
preventer (BOP). This paper aimed at identifying, in a consolidated fashion, pertinent issues 
affecting the BOP device reliability, particularly so in a post-Macondo era. Eighty-two (82) 
documents expounding these challenges between the years 1980 and 2019 were systemically 
reviewed. Major challenges and issues associated with the device design, reliability analysis, 
testing, deployment as well as operability and maintainability were identified. These issues are 
further discussed in the paper as they are deemed critical, not only affecting the safe and proper 
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functioning of the BOP but also incurring significant capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operating 
expenditure (OPEX). The findings from critical reviw of literature include the following: 
• Reduced design, installation and operational costs a  well as increased safety and better 
reliability are all benefits that can be accrued from critical assessments of the identified 
challenges.  
• There has been increased attention, particularly after and as a result of the Macondo 
disaster on the safety of subsea BOPs.  
• Some BOP subsystems were found to be more failure prone than others with annular 
preventer, control pods and LMRP connector requiring greater maintenance effort. 
• Active redundancy has been applied to the BOP system and its components to enhance 
the reliability characteristics of the system. 
• Advanced reliability analysis techniques such as Petri N t (PN), Bayesian network (BN), 
Markov modelling and their different variations have been recognized to overcome the 
drawbacks of conventional reliability assessment techniques such as FTA and FMEA.   
The review of scientific literature revealed that the number of publications about reliability 
analysis of BOP systems is gradually increasing. In spite of remarkable progress in the 
application of various reliability analysis techniques, there are still opportunities for further 
research in this area of study. Some of the potential future research directions are provided 
below:  
1. Comprehensive reliability and availability improvemnts as a result of redundancy. This 
will continuously enhance current drilling trend research; 
2. Accruing updated failure information (failure modes, causes and rates) of subsea BOPs 
with respect to new water depths being explored and the operational and environmental 
challenges that accompany those explorations; 
3. Reliability analyses that account for multiple degradation processes within various BOP 
subsystems as opposed to the current binary outlook.  
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Table 1. Classification of BOP Challenges (deep-water related) 
Category Era Reference Principal Focus 




Pre-Macondo [13] Discussion and description of reliable acoustic control system 
for deepwater subsea blowout preventers (SSBOPs). 
  [14] Use of qualitative risk assessment (QRA) to pri ritize areas of 
greater reliability concern 
  [15] Evaluating failure statistics and testing time consumption for 
83 GOM wells in 400-2000m water depths 
  [16] Positive effects of inspection and testing for high-pressure 
high-temperature (HPHT) BOPs 
  [17] Evaluation of downtime caused by BOP failures and testing 
  [18] 
 
DW BOP reliability and failure rate evaluation. BOP failure 
calculations based on drilling cycle 
  [19] 
 
Reliability analysis across different activity phases and 
operating conditions for subsystems 
  [20] BOP control system reliability relative to maintenance goals 
  [21] 
 
Risk management of surface blowout preventers (SBOPs) in 
DW and comparison with SSBOPs 
  [22] 
 
New hybrid electro-hydraulic control system development for 
DW BOP applications 
  [23] Limitations in accumulator design 
  [24] Comparing risks of different configurations on DP rigs 
  [25] Design challenges and solutions for BOPs (ram prevent r in 
particular) 
  [26] Experience with SBOP and its advantages 
  [27] Automatic monitoring of BOP state to improve maintenance 
 Post-Macondo [12] Forensic investigation of the Macondo BOP 
  [28] Detailed DW SSBOP reliability evaluation and kick data for 
259 wells in the GOM OCS 
  [29] Risk assessment options for operating different BOP 
configurations (SSBOP and SBOP with SID) 
  [30] 
 
Risk analysis of drilling in DW with considerations to leakage 
in ram preventer in particular 
  [31] Condition and performance monitoring of a pressure regulator 
employed on deepwater BOPs 
 
 
Table 2. Classification of BOP Challenges (Shallow water related) 
Category      Era  Reference Principal Focus 
Shallow water 
related 
Pre-Macondo [4] Identifying most failure prone components and reasons for rig 
downtime. (control system ost prone) 
  [32] Testing and maintenance of SSBOP systems 
  [33] Reliability evaluation based on daily drilling, BOP test, 
equipment failure and final well reports from 208 wells drilled 
in the Norwegian sector between 1978-1986 
  [34] Focus on testing and effects on reliability  
  [35] Reliability of BOPs used in the GOM between 2004-2006 
 Post-Macondo - - 
 
 
Table 3. Classification of BOP challenges (General) 
Category Era Reference Principal focus 
General  Pre-Macondo [36] Discussing difficulties with seals 
  [37] Reliability of SSBOPs 
  [38] Reliability of SSBOPs from 1982-1987 
  [39] Investigating accumulator size and its relation to shearing 
  [40] Design considerations and product performance of ram 
preventer seals 
  [41] Reliability of SBOPs in comparison to SSBOPs 
  [42] Overall system reliability based on FMEA and FTA 
  [43] FTA of subsea BOP with and without backup systems 
  [44] Using FTA in BOP reliability analysis 
  [18] Proposal of alternative BOP configuration to improve 
availability 
  [45] Discussion on how specific drilling environment affect BOP 
stack arrangements, kill/choke line requirements, replacement 
part criteria, elastomer application limits, and the use of 
variable bore rams and shear blind rams 
  [46] Review design capabilities of BOP secondary interventions 
systems 
  [47] Investigating shear ram capabilities particularly during erratic 
conditions 
  [48] Improving control system response time 
 Post-Macondo [49] Control system reliability subjected to multiple error shocks 
  [50] Ameliorating shearing capabilities of SSBOP 
  [51] Reliability of SSBOP control system 
  [52] BOP thorough RAM Analysis 
  [53] Using FMECA to evaluate system and subsystem causes and 
effects of loss of functionality 
  [54] Post–Macondo process and procedural changes 
  [55] Reliability based on repair and maintenance strategies 
  [56] Using Bayesian networks from GO models for reliability 
analysis of BOP control system 
  [57] Evaluating the effects of diagnostic and repair r tes on the 
performance (RAMS) of SSBOP using Stochastic Petri Nets 
 
  [58] Quantitative risk analysis of overall SSBOP operations 
  [59] Employing Petri nets for reliability and availability analysis of 
annular preventer 
  [60] New approach for monitoring assembly, disassembly and 
maintenance operations on BOPs 
  [61] Design study of shear rams based on simulation and sensitivity 
analysis 
  [62] Dynamic safety assessment approach based on Bw-tie 
analysis for drilling equipment is presented 
  [63] Markov modelling of reliability considering common-cause 
failures and redundancy 
  [64] Availability and reliability of SSBOP componets using Petri 
nets, considering effects of failure rates and repai  time 
  [65] Risk analysis of annular preventer using FTA 
  [66] FMECA with MCDM for reliability analysis 
  [67] Reliability evaluation of subsea pipe ram preventer using 
dynamic Bayesian networks (DBN) 
  [68] Fault diagnosis of hydraulic control system using DBN 
  [69] Using Markov modelling to evaluate aspects of safety 
performance and maintenance optimisation 
  [70] Reliability using DBN and focus on common-cause failures 
  [71] Usage of precursor data and approximate reasoning to evaluate 
reliability 
  [72] Studying damage and failure of shear ram and its effects on the 
shearing process 
  [73] Evaluation of SSBOP safety integrity levels 
  [74] BOP system and subsystem reliability and testing 
  [75] Reliability and availability improvements using expanded 
FMEA 
  [76] Novel risk-based methodology for maintenance s heduling 
  [77] Reliability analysis of annular BOP using FTA and fuzzy 
relation analysis theory 
  [78] PHM and CBM concepts towards BOP reliability 
  [79] Risk analysis of BOPs using hybrid of FTA and FMEA 
  [80] Performance analysis of subsea BOP hydraulic seals 
  [81] Risk analysis of BOP by mapping GO model into equivalent 
BNs 
  [82] Real-time condition and performance monitoring of BOP using 
adaptive physics based models 
  [83] Availability analysis of blind shear ram preventer using 
Markov model 
  [84] Qualitative FTA for availability of BOP with respect to 
different requirements 
  [85] Implementing condition-based maintenance to improve 
reliability of subsea BOP 
 
 
Table 4. Distribution of the literature by BOP reliability analysis techniques. 
Reference FMECA FMEA FTA MM MCS RBD PN BN 
[15]   ✔      
[18]   ✔      
[28] ✔        
[30]        ✔ 
[33]   ✔      
[42]  ✔ ✔      
[49]    ✔     
[51]        ✔ 
[52]      ✔   
[53] ✔        
[54] ✔        
[55]        ✔ 
[56]        ✔ 
[57]       ✔  
[58]        ✔ 
[59]       ✔  
[62]   ✔      
[63]    ✔     
[64]       ✔  
[65]   ✔      
[67]        ✔ 
[68]        ✔ 
[70]        ✔ 
[73]      ✔   
[74] ✔ ✔       
Reference FMECA FMEA FTA MM MCS RBD PN BN 
[75]  ✔       
[79]  ✔ ✔      
[81]        ✔ 
[83]    ✔     
[84]   ✔      
[94]    ✔     
[107]   ✔      
[108]      ✔   
[109]   ✔      





(a)                                                       (b) 





 To review current state-of-the-art of subsea blowout preventer (BOP) technology; 
 To identify challenges in BOP design, reliability, testing, deployment, and 
maintenance; 
 To classify the literature based on depth of water and the Macondo disaster; 
 To evaluate the techniques applied to reliability analysis of BOP; 
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